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Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever
INTRODUCTION
One of the central insights of economic analyses of patent law is that context matters.1 As 
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson observe, patents impact innovation very differently for discrete, 
cumulative, chemical, and science-based technologies.2 In general, overly narrow patents will 
not provide adequate incentive to develop an invention, while overly broad rights will preempt too 
many rivalrous developments.3 The key is to strike the right balance, one where patents induce 
??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????4
Among the many potential levers for striking the right balance is patent scope: the amount 
of “coverage” afforded to a patent.  At an abstract level, patent scope for any given invention 
may be construed broadly or narrowly, and there are theoretical arguments in favor of each. 
Merges and Nelson enter into this debate, and they are not agnostic.  Contrary to “prospect” 
theorists who favor broad, early patent rights on inventions,5 Merges and Nelson argue in favor 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????6
The objective of calibrating patent scope is one of the holy grails of patent law: great in theory 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
identify appropriate places in the patent system where actors analyze and exercise discretion 
over patent scope.  Merges and Nelson consider several, including: 1) patent prosecution, 
?????????? ?????????? ????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
claims;7 2) doctrines of disclosure and enablement, in which a patent’s technical disclosure 
* Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law.  I would like to thank Mark Janis for inviting me to 
participate in the symposium entitled “Patent Scope Revisited: Merges & Nelson’s ‘On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope,’ 20 Years After” at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
1.  Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV.????????????
2.  Id. at 880-908.
3.  Id. at 875.
4.  See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1590????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5.  Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.????????????
6.  Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 872.
7.  Id. at 844-45.
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8.  Id. at 845-52.
9.  Id. at 852-68.
10.  Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim 
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY. L. REV.?????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tion as a vehicle for implementing patent policy).
????????????????????????????
12.  See In re ???????????????????????????????????????????????
13.  See ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?? ??????
Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH.?????????????
?????????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????????8 3) and the law of infringement, which can 
narrow or widen the effective scope of a patent.9
This Essay explores another mechanism for calibrating patent scope: claim construction. 
Claim construction is the process by which judges construe the meaning of terms in patent 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of much claim construction, this Essay argues that policy considerations should guide this 
discretion in productive directions.  Where traditional interpretative methodologies do not 
yield a clear answer, courts should consider the technological contributions of a patented 
invention and the competitive dynamics of a particular industry when construing claims. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by a patent and narrowly where contributions are marginal or technological development 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
fashion, “substantive” claim construction can serve as a lever for optimizing patent scope.10
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??????????? ???????????? ????? ???? ???????? ????????? ???? ???????????? ?????
II elaborates in greater detail the proposal for courts to utilize claim construction as a 
patent scope lever. By considering substantive and policy factors as claim construction 
“tiebreakers,” courts can conscientiously construe claims broadly or narrowly so as to best 
promote technological progress. While this proposal seems radical, Part III argues that it 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
claiming as well as the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on patent law.  Part IV explores the 
unique advantages of this proposal and responds to several prominent objections
I. THE CURRENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION LANDSCAPE
Before proposing any change, it is useful to consider the current law and institutional 
framework of claim construction.  By statute, all patents conclude with one or more claims, 
which are highly stylized sentences “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”11?????????????????????????????
bounds” of an invention,12 and claim construction—the process by which courts construe 
claim terms—often determines the outcome of infringement litigation.13 As we will see, 
claim construction is not only very important, it is also highly controversial.  
101
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????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????aff’d ??????????? ???????????????????????????Markman 
II???????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
18.  See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J.????????????????????
19.  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Con-
struction, 157 U. PA. L. REV????????????????????
20.  Id. at 1751.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
perform.  The translation of a novel, nonobviousness invention to written claims is fraught 
with indeterminacy.  As the Court of Claims, a precursor to the Federal Circuit, famously 
noted, the “conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot 
?????????????????????????14????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
controversy in this area, much of it centering on who should perform claim construction 
and how it should be performed.  The following discussion explores the relevant doctrine in 
greater detail by examining three key decisions.
First, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. ?Markman I), the Federal Circuit held, 
???? ???? ???????? ?????? ????????? ????? ??????? ??????? ????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ??????
construction.15 Second, in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that 
claim construction is a pure question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.16 Finally, in Phillips 
v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit established a general interpretative framework for claim 
construction.17??????????????Phillips held that courts construing claims should place greater 
weight on “intrinsic evidence,” which includes the literal wording of the claims themselves, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
includes information from outside sources, such as dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony. 
??? ????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ??????????? ???????????? ??????? ????? ??????????
a few salient points.  On its face, Markman’s holding that judges rather than juries should 
perform claim construction seems quite sensible.  While neither juries nor judges are technical 
experts, judges’ specialized experience in construing documents likely renders them better 
situated to construe complex patent claims.18 However, Markman’s assignment of claim 
construction to judges, and the establishment of separate Markman hearings to construe 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
formally separate claim construction from other issues in litigation, namely patent validity 
and infringement.  Prior to Markman??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
validity, and infringement in an integrated, holistic fashion.19 After Markman, this was no 
longer the case.  
This compartmentalized emphasis on claim construction has helped harden a system of 
?????????????????????? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exclusive rights.20 Within peripheral claiming, “legal interpretation of words has taken the 
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21.  Id. at 1762.
22.  Id??????????????????????????????????????????????Markman helped diminish the importance of 
the doctrine of equivalents, a historically valuable lever for calibrating patent scope.  Application of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????Markman hearings) have exerted so much effort to construe.  
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 
59 STAN. L. REV.??????????????????????????????????Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of 
Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.??????????????????
23.  See, e.g???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? id????????????????????????????????????id????????????????????????????????????
in the judgment); id?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????id. at 1480-81 
?????????????????????????????????????????
????? ????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
C.J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
25.  Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.?????????????????
26.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1751-52.
?????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????????21 This elevation of form 
over substance leaves little if any room for normative and policy considerations.  Thus, in 
contrast to Merges and Nelson’s objective of calibrating patent scope, “the result of this 
collateral process [of claim construction] bears only a coincidental relationship to the ideal 
scope of the patent claim.”22
The Federal Circuit’s de novo standard for reviewing claim construction, established in 
Cybor, has also proven highly controversial.  In a number of concurrences and additional 
views issued in this in banc decision, several Federal Circuit judges argued for some degree 
of deference to trial courts.23 Among other considerations, district courts are closer to the 
technological facts of a patent dispute and may consult outside resources to aid in claim 
construction that are unavailable to judges of the Federal Circuit.  Since Cybor, problems 
with the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard of review have become well known.  These 
include:   
???? ?? ????????? ????? ????????? ?????? ???? ?? ????? ??? ??????????????? ?????? ??????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ???????? ?????????????????????
numerous disputed claim terms in . . . nearly every patent case.24
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
after Markman found a 34.5% reversal rate of district court claim constructions at the 
Federal Circuit,25 which is substantially higher than its rate of reversing district court rulings 
in general.26
Phillips and its literalist approach to claim construction have also been widely criticized. 
Commenting on earlier cases that ultimately culminated in Phillips, Craig Allen Nard has 
103
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27.  Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH.?????????????
???????? ??? ???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????see Burk & 
Lemley, supra note 19, at 1753.
29.  See Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J.???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Phillips???????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???????????????????????
Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurispru-
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
construction appeals at the Federal Circuit increased after Phillips).
30.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1744.
31.  John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to their “Interpretive Community”: A 
Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.????????????????????
32.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1751.
33.  Id. at 1745.
characterized this inward-looking claim construction methodology as “hypertextualist.”27 
These days, entire claim construction disputes revolve around the meaning of words such as 
“a.”28 Such a textualist, inward-looking approach to claim construction deprioritizes contextual 
factors such as expert testimony and industry dynamics that speak to an invention’s substantive 
technological contribution.  This literalist claim construction methodology, moreover, cannot even 
assert the virtues of certainty and predictability.  Claim construction after Phillips is still marred 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????29
As a general matter, the current framework for claim construction simply “isn’t working.”30 
Perhaps most importantly, it undermines certainty in two ways.  First, claim construction remains 
highly indeterminate.  Claims have become highly technical and formal, and drafting and reading 
claims has become an art in its own right with its own particular conventions.  Indeed, as John 
Golden observes, it is unlikely that an ordinary technical artisan, unversed in these conventions, 
can glean much of anything from patent claims.31 Second, even after a district court has issued 
a claim construction ruling, the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard of review extends this 
uncertainty deep into the latter stages of patent litigation.  The district court’s claim construction 
is but an opening gambit that has a good chance of being reversed on appeal.32 
In addition to these general critiques, the current claim construction framework is 
particularly ill-suited for calibrating patent scope.  Claim construction has become an 
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
invention.33 The current system thus cannot operationalize the insight that optimizing claim 
scope requires a thorough understanding of an invention, its technical contributions, and its 
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????Phillips’ literalist claim construction 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
information technology) advances rapidly with rivalrous competition might auger in favor of 
construing patents narrowly.  However, under the Phillips rubric, such extrinsic information 
has little if any place in construing claims.  
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34.  Of course, it may seem odd to shore up ex ante incentives to invent with ex post claim con-
structions.  However, this limitation would be eliminated over time as courts developed a track 
history of construing pioneering inventions broadly, thus establishing ex ante expectations of broad 
coverage.
35.  Congress is beset by interest group politics that may discourage such a proposal.  Cf. Rochelle 
Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1571 
???????
36.  See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Exchange: The Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. 
L.J.?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
doctrine of equivalents.  See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 
???????? ???? ??????????The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. 
REV.?????????????????????
37.  See? ???????? ???????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
38.  As such, there are clear parallels between this proposal and the European practice of “purpo-
sive” claim interpretation, which is neither extremely literalist nor completely divorced from patent 
text.  See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS???????????????????????
II. THE PROPOSAL: SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AS A PATENT SCOPE LEVER
To address these limitations, this Essay proposes reforming claim construction so that it 
can better serve as a lever for calibrating patent scope.  This proposal would render patent 
scope more sensitive to economic and industrial context as well as address several lingering 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
holistic approach to claim construction in which courts augment their Phillips analysis by 
considering a patented invention’s technological contribution, attributes of the allegedly 
infringing device, and the competitive landscape in which these technologies operate. 
Where the Phillips methodology does not yield a clear interpretation, I suggest that policy 
considerations aimed at promoting technological progress should inform claim construction. 
Thus, depending on context, courts should construe terms broadly based on an invention’s 
considerable technological merit and the need to maintain strong incentives to invent34 or 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
This new approach could arise in several ways.  Most ambitiously, Congress could amend 
the Patent Act to clarify that courts should consider an invention’s technological merit, 
???? ???????? ???????? ???? ???? ???????????? ????????? ??? ?? ??????????? ?????????? ???????????
claims.  Because legislative action is unlikely,35 however, such reform is more likely to arise 
from the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court.  Indeed, in some ways, this proposal simply 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
scope: 1) the “pioneer inventions” doctrine whereby foundational advances of high social 
value receive broader construction36 and 2) the principle that public notice concerns weigh 
in favor of construing claims narrowly where both broad and narrow interpretations are 
equally plausible.37 Whatever the mechanisms used, this proposal would shift attention away 
from the literal text of patent claims and more toward a substantive appraisal of a patent’s 
technological contribution.38
105
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??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????Phillips, Wang nevertheless ex-
???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
See Cotropia, supra note 10, at 107-08.
40.  197 F.3d at 1380.  In character-based display protocols, the screen is divided into a grid, and the 
system places a character in each cell of the grid.  In bit-mapped display protocols, the system en-
codes an image with reference to the individual pixels of a monitor.  Id. 
41.  Id. at 1382.
42.  Id. 
43.  Recent Federal Circuit doctrine has begun to capture this insight.  Compare SRI Int’l v. Matsu-
????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of accused products in claim construction), with???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
44.  On a related note, the alleged infringer, who has strong incentives to distinguish her product 
from the patented invention, is a valuable source of extrinsic information relevant to claim construc-
tion.  Thomas, supra note 22, at 167-68.
To illustrate this new approach, consider a pre-Phillips claim construction dispute, Wang 
Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.39 In this case, Wang sued America Online for 
infringing its patent on an online information display system.  A crucial issue was whether 
the term “frame” in Wang’s patent claims encompassed only “character-based” display 
protocols, or if it also covered “bit-mapped” display protocols, both of which existed at 
the time of invention.40 Patentee Wang favored the broader construction while defendant 
America Online, whose system used a bit-mapped protocol, argued that “frame” was limited 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Federal Circuit held that a “frame” only referred to a character-mapped system.41 However, the 
court integrated its analysis with references to extrinsic evidence, notably inventor testimony 
that “Wang had not been able to implement a bit-mapped protocol in the claimed system.”42
While Phillips would downplay the importance of such extrinsic evidence, I argue that it 
should have greater probative weight for several reasons.  First, it provides a more accurate 
depiction of the technological scope of the patented invention.  Wang’s awareness of and 
inability to practice a bit-mapped protocol suggests that its patent should be appropriately 
cabined.  While intrinsic evidence is likely to describe what an invention is, it is not likely 
to describe what it is not ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
what an invention is not can be crucial to demarcating its appropriate boundaries.  Second, 
this evidence highlights the clarifying role of the allegedly infringing device in construing 
patent claims.43 By providing a concrete basis for comparison, the accused device can focus 
and clarify claim construction.44
This proposal for a more substantive approach to claim construction would both effectuate 
and necessitate several reforms to the current legal framework.  Most fundamentally, it would 
encourage a more holistic approach to claim interpretation, integrating claim construction 
with considerations of validity and infringement.  Additionally, it would increase reliance 
on extrinsic evidence, including a wider universe of extrinsic evidence than contemplated 
in the Phillips framework.  Within that framework, extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, 
IP THEORY Volume 1:  Issue 2
45.  Along these lines, the Federal Circuit could play a salutary role by reviewing policy determina-
tions and providing high-level guidance to district courts.  Given its vast exposure to patent litiga-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
logical progress.  For example, in the nonobviousness context, the Federal Circuit has indicated that 
biotechnology is an “unpredictable art” while computer science is more “predictable.”  See Dan L. 
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, ?????????????????????????????????, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????-
tries where rivalrous competition and narrow patents are most conducive to innovation.  
46.  Cf. Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 355, 369.
47.  Thomas, supra note 22, at 162.
?????????? ?????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????????????? ??? ?????????????? ??????? ????
proposal would allow judges to also consider extrinsic evidence directed to exogenous 
???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Emphasizing extrinsic evidence and policy considerations also suggests a more deferential 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??? ????????? ?????? ?????? ????????????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????????????? ?????? ??????
say mischaracterization) of claim construction as a pure question of law.  This proposal, 
however, explicitly recognizes the factual nature of claim construction, thus lending itself to 
more deferential review.  While the “clear error” standard for pure factual questions may be 
inappropriate, an intermediate standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact may 
strike the right balance.  Additionally, to the extent that equitable and policy considerations 
inform a district court’s claim construction, the relatively deferential “abuse of discretion” 
standard for review may be appropriate.  Alternatively, a hybrid standard may emerge in which 
the Federal Circuit reviews policy determinations de novo while reviewing the underlying 
facts informing such determinations for clear error.45 Whatever the precise standard, greater 
deference would help ameliorate the lingering uncertainty that currently taints district court 
claim constructions on appeal.46
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
First, this proposal is intended merely as a “tiebreaker” where traditional claim construction 
methodology does not provide a clear answer.  This approach does not displace the Phillips 
framework; it merely supplements it.  As such, it would apply with greater or lesser force to 
different technological areas.  For example, while chemistry and biotechnology inventions 
lend themselves to accurate representation in words, construing claim terms for machines 
and software may leave more room for interpretation.47 
Second, this proposal merely makes explicit what courts are probably doing anyway.  As 
seen in Wang Laboratories, courts are likely to consider the accused product when construing 
patent claims.  After all, claim construction is but a predicate step in an overarching process 
of determining infringement.  This proposal also parallels judicial intuition to the extent that 
an invention that has made a larger technological contribution should be entitled to a broader 
107
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48.  See supra note 36.
49.  See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 70-71 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
expands a patentee’s zone of exclusive rights beyond the literal scope of her claims.
50.  I use the term “patent construction” to emphasize the integrated, holistic nature of this analysis 
that goes beyond simply parsing the words of patent claims.
51.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1746.
52.  Golden, supra note 31, at 362.
53.  Id. at 352.
construction, a principle that informs the historical doctrine of pioneer patents.48 The following 
Part draws upon both historical practice and recent developments in patent law to further 
underscore the plausibility and desirability of utilizing claim construction as a scope lever.
III. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY GUIDANCE
As one theme of this Essay is context, it is useful to situate the proposal advanced here 
within a historical and contemporary landscape.  This Part argues that the current proposal for 
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
historical use of central claiming as well as the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on patent law. 
A. Central Claiming
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
many of the principles of central claiming.  As noted, modern U.S. patent law generally 
????????? ????????????? ????????? ??????? ???????????????? ????????????? ?????????? ?????????? ???
inventor’s exclusive rights.49 However, throughout much of its history, the United States 
utilized a central claiming system that operated very differently.  In such a system, the patentee 
typically describes one or more representative embodiments of an invention that demonstrate 
its central technological core or essence.  Patentees then enjoy a zone of exclusivity that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
Central claiming is indelibly linked to a more holistic, substantive approach to patent 
construction.50 Within such a system, “courts determine how much protection the patent is entitled 
to by looking at the prior art that cabins the invention, how important the patentee’s invention 
was, and how different the accused device is.”51 This holistic approach encouraged substantive 
engagement with inventions and their technical merit and eschewed a legalistic focus on patent text. 
According to John Golden, “The protracted historical mixing of patent construction questions with 
those of validity, merit, and equivalence provided fertile ground for assertions that a technology-
centered, rather than a law-centered, perspective should govern determinations of claim scope.”52
Thus up until recent times, courts commonly integrated claim scope inquiries with 
evaluations of a patent’s validity, technological merit, and social worth.53 As Golden notes, 
IP THEORY Volume 1:  Issue 2
54.  ??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
55.  ??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
56.  See Golden, supra note 31, at 349, 353-56. 
????????????????????????
58.  Id. at 63.
?????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????see Golden, supra note 31, at 355.
61.  Golden, supra????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
distinguish between determination of claims’ literal scope—a process today characterized as ‘claim 
construction’—and determination of a claimed invention’s equivalents, a process currently charac-
terized as part of the infringement inquiry.”).
this practice persisted deep into the twentieth century, well after congressional enactments in 
183654 and 187055 initiated the transition to peripheral claiming.56 The well-known Supreme 
Court case of Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.57 offers a particularly 
cogent example of this more holistic approach to patent construction.  There, the Court stated:
????????????????? ??????????? ????? ??????????????? ?????? ????? ????????? ???????????? ????
real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is, and whether it has advanced the art 
substantially.  If it has done so, then the court is liberal in its construction of the patent, 
to secure to the inventor the reward he deserves.  If what he has done works only a 
slight step forward . . . then his patent, if sustained, will be given a narrow scope, and 
infringement will be found only in approximate copies of the new device.58
Similarly, in Cole v. Malleable Iron Fittings Co., Judge Learned Hand rejected a literalist 
approach to patent scope by observing that “the interpretation of patent claims depends 
more upon the advance made by the inventor than upon the words used.”59 And as recently 
as 1966, the Supreme Court integrated questions of technological merit and patent validity 
when construing the claims of a patented battery in United States v. Adams.60 Placed in 
historical context, the current approach to claim construction, marked by isolation from other 
infringement inquires and hypertextualism, represents a break from longstanding practice.61 
However, while extolling the virtues of central claiming, it is important to distinguish my 
proposal from past practice.  Rather than advocate a return to central claiming, I frame my 
proposal as an intermediate approach that is situated within the modern system of peripheral 
claiming.  While central claiming and concomitant claim construction methodologies offer 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
boundaries of a patentee’s exclusive rights.  There is value to be gained from the concreteness 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
concreteness than promised).  Along these lines, where modern claim construction provides 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
construction loses force.  However, where this is not the case and courts must exercise 
discretion, historical practices of holistic patent construction may prove instructive.
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B. The Supreme Court’s Holistic Turn
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in recent patent decisions by the Supreme Court.  At a broad level, a potential objection 
to the proposal herein advanced is that factually-intensive claim construction may create 
uncertainty and leave too much discretion to district court judges.  However, in its recent patent 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has consistently favored holistic standards over formalistic 
rules, thus creating a doctrinal climate conducive to substantive claim construction.
As I have described elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s recent re-entry into patent law has been 
accompanied by a notable methodological shift.62 Whereas Federal Circuit patent doctrine has 
long been characterized as formalistic,63 the Supreme Court’s recent patent decisions have had 
a decidedly holistic character.  In doctrinal areas as diverse as prosecution history estoppel, 
nonobviousness, and remedies, the Supreme Court has eschewed bright-line rules in favor of multi-
factored standards and broad judicial engagement with technological facts.64 This “holistic turn,” 
provides conceptual support for the substantive approach to claim construction proposed here.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on nonobviousness. 
Historically, the Federal Circuit applied a formalistic test for nonobviousness that heavily 
emphasized the presence or absence of some “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to create the 
patented invention at issue.65??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
of obviousness, while the absence of such a factor weighed heavily toward nonobviousness. 
In ?????????????????????????????????????, the Supreme Court repudiated the Federal Circuit’s 
formalistic application of the “TSM” test.66 In its place, the Court emphasized the “functional,” 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????67 Rather 
than rely on “precise teachings” from the prior art, courts should consider a larger universe 
of more amorphous factors, such as industry dynamics and market demand, in determining 
nonobviousness.  KSR thus repudiates formalistic, inward-looking inquiries in favor of 
holistic standards featuring greater factual analysis and judicial discretion.68
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This “holistic turn” resonates well with the current proposal to inject greater factual and 
policy considerations into claim construction.  The Supreme Court has consistently rejected 
literalist, formalistic reasoning in favor of contextual inquiries.  There is a concern, of course, 
that these inquiries will raise the information costs of adjudication and overwhelm generalist 
judges lacking technical expertise.69 Nevertheless, the Court has implicitly concluded that 
achieving accurate outcomes in patent litigation often requires courts to grapple more deeply 
with technological facts and context.70 Turning to the proposal at hand, with appropriate 
guidance,71 there is reason to believe that district courts can effectively perform substantive 
claim construction,72 considering not only the Phillips framework but also additional 
contextual factors when interpreting claims.
IV. ADVANTAGES, OBJECTIONS, AND RESPONSES
This proposal for substantive claim construction confers several advantages.  First 
and foremost, it begins to realize the “holy grail” of calibrating patent scope to maintain 
??????????? ??? ??????? ???????? ??????? ?????????? ??????????? ????????????? ??? ?? ?????? ? ????
United States employs a “unitary” patent system that, at least nominally, applies the same 
standards of patentability and confers the same bundle of rights to all inventions.73 However, 
there is much wisdom to tailoring patent law to particular inventions and industries.74 The 
current proposal allows courts to operationalize the economic insight that context should 
help determine the breadth or narrowness of particular patents. 
This proposal would transform claim construction from a literalist exercise in parsing words 
to a substantive examination of a patented invention.  In doing so, it would focus attention on 
“the issues that really matter in deciding patent scope—the importance of the invention in the 
industry, the nature of the technology, how this invention relates to others in producing marketable 
products, and the relationship between the patentee’s invention and the accused device.”75
In addition, the present proposal would ameliorate several longstanding defects of the 
???????? ????? ????????????????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ?????????????????????
of claim construction from validity and infringement inquiries.  More substantively, it would 
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dating claims based on failure to satisfy the written description requirement).
help reduce the lingering uncertainty arising from pure de novo review of claim constructions 
on appeal.  This proposal takes seriously the factual basis for claim construction, thus 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to a central issue in patent litigation.
A. Comparative Considerations
Any proposal for reform must not only articulate its own virtues, it must also address its 
relative strengths compared to other potential solutions.  At the outset, I do not contend that 
claim construction is categorically superior for calibrating patent scope than other potential 
levers.  Perhaps a multi-pronged strategy involving reforming claim construction as well as 
utilizing other mechanisms is ideal.  That being said, reforming claim construction enjoys 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
on the other “scope levers” discussed by Merges and Nelson: patent prosecution, doctrines of 
disclosure and enablement, and infringement analysis.
First, the current proposal exhibits certain advantages relative to relying on the PTO to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ???????????????????
the universe of information about a patent is somewhat limited.  Just as secondary considerations 
of nonobviousness are likely to become apparent only after a patented invention has been on the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
after the passage of time.  Courts adjudicating infringement suits thus have access to a broader 
array of information than is available to the PTO at the time of prosecution.76 Second, while the 
PTO is fairly limited in its resources, litigation will likely motivate parties to provide more and 
better information about a patent and its context.  Finally, prosecution proceeds without any 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????77 As discussed, however, the accused 
product in an infringement suit can shed valuable light on the optimal scope of a patent.  
Second, calibrating patent scope through claim construction enjoys several advantages 
relative to relying on doctrines of disclosure and enablement.  Enablement and the written 
description requirement operate as binary on-off switches: a court either holds that a claim is 
valid, or, if the claim exceeds what the patent enabled or described, the court must invalidate 
it in full.78 Claim construction, however, represents a scalpel by which court may choose 
?? ????????? ??? ???????? ????????????? ??? ?? ??????????? ????? ??????? ????? ????????? ??? ??????????
an entire claim.  Instinctively, one might argue that this violates the well-established canon 
????? ??????????? ???? ????? ???????????? ????? ???? ????????????? ????? ???? ???????? ? ????? ???????
however, is already in tension with the equally well-established principle that courts must 
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???????????? ??? ????????? ???? ?????????????79 Moreover, it bears emphasizing that under my 
proposal, substantive and policy considerations only come into play when traditional claim 
construction does not yield a clear answer; given the void that some interpretive gloss must 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Third, the present proposal exhibits certain institutional advantages relative to calibrating 
patent scope through infringement analysis.  Whatever claim construction’s metaphysical 
status as a question of law or a “mongrel practice,” well-settled law holds that judges rather 
than juries construe claims.80 Infringement, however, is a question of fact often resolved by 
juries.  Although open to debate, the implicit institutional competence rationale of Markman I 
and II suggests that judges are better suited than juries at construing documents and evidence 
of a highly technical nature.81 Furthermore, to the extent that “optimizing” patent scope is 
a discretionary judgment infused with policy considerations, such inquiries seem better 
suited for judges than juries.  These institutional considerations suggest that judge-mediated 
claim construction represents a more appropriate context for patent scope calibration than 
infringement analysis.  Finally, as noted, one of the principal infringement levers for calibrating 
patent scope—the doctrine of equivalents—has fallen into disfavor after Markman.  This 
again suggests that claim construction is a more promising avenue for calibrating patent scope.
B. Objections and Responses
Of course, utilizing claim construction as a scope lever must address a host of potential 
objections.  First, critics might object that substantive claim construction would undermine 
certainty, predictability, and the public notice function of claims.82 However, the simple 
response to this critique is that the current system does not provide much certainty anyway. 
According to Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, the current system based on peripheral claiming 
has “failed catastrophically” in providing clear notice of the metes and bounds of a patent 
right.  Furthermore, it bears emphasizing that substantive claim construction is only intended 
as a tiebreaker where the Phillips analysis does not yield a clear answer.  Additionally, while 
????? ???????????????????????????? ????? ??? ???????? ??????? ??? ??? ????? ?????????? ???????? ??
Markman ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
level of deference afforded to claim constructions on appeal. 
  
At a theoretical level, some might object that this proposal would radically and 
inappropriately transform claim construction from a descriptive to a normative exercise. 
Put differently, courts should ascertain the objective metes and bounds of a patent rather than 
determine some ideal claim scope based on normative and policy considerations.  Again, 
the status of this proposal as an interpretative tiebreaker where no objective construction is 
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clear should allay much of this anxiety.  Additionally, this critique presumes that language is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
technology via written text.  Without wading too deeply into metaphysics, I would simply 
?????????? ?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????83 While claim 
construction is supposed to be a descriptive endeavor, the limitations of language frequently 
?????? ???????? ??? ??????????? ? ??? ????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????????
???????????????????????????
Finally, some might object that factually-intensive claim construction would overwhelm 
the technical capacity of generalist judges.  Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, the current 
hypertextualist approach to claim construction may decrease judicial engagement with 
technology, thus simplifying adjudication.84 As mentioned above, however, the Supreme 
?????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ??????? ???????????
technological facts and apply broad standards.  Additionally, there is a sense in which 
substantive claim construction may be more intuitive than the current framework.  While 
claim drafting and reading has developed its own specialized jargon, courts already resort to 
common sense when literal interpretations lead to absurd results.85
CONCLUSION
Calibrating patent scope based on technological and economic context represents the holy 
grail of the patent system.  Ideally, patents would confer enough economic power to reward 
????? ????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????? ?????????? ??????????? ????????????? ??? ??
?????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
lever for optimizing claim scope.  In close cases, courts should draw on a host of contextual 
factors and integrate considerations of validity, infringement, and competitive dynamics when 
??????????? ???????? ?????????????? ????? ????????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ??? ???????????
???????????????????? ??? ??????????????? ?????????????? ????????????? ???????????? ??? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ??? ????????????? ??????????????????
could help operationalize the insight that when optimizing patent scope, context matters.
